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While the research community is often very concerned with the distributional effect of 
public policy decisions, the geographic distribution of the affected populations is often 
overlooked.  This paper argues that seemingly geographically neutral policies have 
spatial consequences and that the choice of how to measure them is important.  We 
suggest that maps produced by geographical information systems (GIS) provide a 
powerful tool for communicating these ideas to policy makers.  We further suggest that 
GIS supplemented by spatial statistics yield geographic information that can perform a 
valuable function in policy debates.  We use the recent proposed changes in Medicaid 
expenditures in Ohio to illustrate how geographic information provides insights into the 
spatial consequences of these changes by introducing a simple method to weight the 
impact of expenditure changes. 
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Introduction 
Some policies, such as those to close unnecessary military bases, have obvious 
geographic implications.  The decision to close a base can lead to the immediate loss of 
hundreds to thousands of jobs in a local community.  In response to previous base 
closings, both public and private help has been made available to ease the blow to the 
affected areas (Murphy, 1993).  Other policies, however, may have impacts that are less 
obviously tied to geography.  For instance, changes in Social Security benefits are likely 
to have disproportionate impacts on communities with more retirees.  Such spatial 
clustering of affected populations can increase the magnitude of the effects of a policy 
change, and failure to recognize these spatial effects may inhibit consideration of policy 
responses that address the local implications such as those that accompany base closings.   
While any policy targeted at individuals will have spatial implications if people 
are not randomly distributed, more emphasis is typically placed on the other 
distributional effects of policy changes.  These discussions often focus on distributional 
effects across economic classes (e.g., Jones and Weinberg, 2000; Piketty and Saez, 2003), 
such as the examination of changes in tax rates (Petska and Strudler, 2003).  
Distributional effects across other dimensions are also considered, including the 
intergenerational implications of tax policy (Heijdra and Ligthart, 2002) or generational 
implications of budget deficits and health care policy (Auerbach, et al., 1994).  Similarly, 
investments in medical research and accessibility yield variable benefits for males or 
females or across ethnic or social groups (e.g., Kadar, 1994).  However, in studying the 
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distributional effects of policy changes, the effect of geography tends to be underplayed 
or underestimated. 
The geographic distribution of programmatic effects is worth noting because 
place can have important influences, for instance, on welfare (Berube and Tiffany, 2004).  
While the role of place is recognized in the literature, and there are numerous polices that 
explicitly address spatial inequities, there is often a tendency to ignore the spatial 
distributional effects of programs that are not geographically targeted.  For instance, 
federal policies have important effects on state and local budget sustainability (Lav, 
2003).  Fiscal need varies across space if people are not randomly distributed across 
economic, social, and demographic characteristics.  Similarly, the cost of delivering the 
same service varies spatially.  Differences in fiscal capacity, the ability of a government 
to raise revenues, may compound these effects.  Thus, even seemingly geographically 
neutral programs will often have spatial consequences.  The spatial disparities in effects 
are also influenced by the magnitude to which fiscal and decision-making authorities are 
devolved from federal to state and local governments (Tannenwald, 1999).   
This paper highlights that regardless of the nature of the consequences of policy 
changes, these consequences are likely to be distributed unevenly across space.  The 
paper first argues that because geography matters, it is important to examine geographic 
distributional effects.  We next develop and demonstrate the use of simple techniques for 
measuring spatial variability.  Using a case study of the potential effects of changes in 
Medicaid expenditures in Ohio, we then show that the spatial consequences of policy 
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changes are non-trivial and vary depending upon choice of measurement.  We conclude 
with some thoughts on how these tools can be applied to help inform policy decisions.    
The Role of Place 
While the field of geography is premised upon the notion that place is important, 
the notion is not lost on the other social sciences (Dietz, 2002).  It is recognized that there 
are knowledge spillovers that benefit business firms that locate near other businesses in 
the same industry (Audretsch and Feldman, 1996).  It is also well documented that people 
are not randomly distributed across space.  In the United States, poverty has become 
increasingly concentrated in the largest cities (Jargowsky, 1997; HUD, 1997), although 
this trend may have reversed somewhat during the 1990s (Jargosky, 2003).  While part of 
increased economic segregation may be due to market forces, some have argued that it is 
also the direct result of policy choices (Dreier, et al., 2001; Wilson, 1999).  This 
concentration has fiscal consequences that affect the equitable funding of services such as 
police protection and school funding (Orfield, 1997); social consequences such as sprawl 
(Savitch, 2003) and crime (Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Morenoff, et al., 2001); and 
economic consequences such as labor market activity (Weinberg, et al., forthcoming) and 
access to vital services such as health care (Chandra and Skinner, 2003).  In addition, 
concentration may create a spatial mismatch between where the unemployed poor live 
and where employment opportunities exist (Holzer, 1991; Ihlanfeldt, 1994; Kain, 1968). 
Some policy has explicitly considered geographic disparity, such as Canada’s 
attempts to equalize per capita tax burdens across provinces (Shah, 1996); regional 
economic development policy such as the European Union’s Structural Funds and the 
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United States’ Regional Commissions (Sweet, 1999); or programs that target economic 
development incentives to particular distressed areas, such as enterprise zone 
(Greenbaum, 2004; Peters and Fisher, 2002).  Given that spatial inequalities exist, it is 
still an open question whether policy should explicitly focus on places rather than people 
(Engberg, 1996; Gyourko, 1998; Ladd, 1994; Mills and Lubuele, 1997).   
Rather than add to that debate, we emphasize that even seemingly geographically 
neutral policies have spatial implications due to clustering of similar populations and 
spillovers.  For instance, Glendon and Vigdor (2003) found that economic outcomes in 
neighboring counties were spatially correlated primarily because neighbors shared similar 
industrial characteristics.  Thus, exogenous shocks lead to similar outcomes in 
neighboring counties.  They also found some evidence of spillovers across similar 
industries in neighboring counties.  Spillovers between neighboring spatial units implies 
that economic activity in one place may have a causal relationship with activity in 
neighboring areas.  Examples include the causal relationships between states’ 
expenditures and those of its neighbors (Case, et al., 1993), the influence of negotiated 
public school teacher salaries on salaries in neighboring school districts (Greenbaum, 
2002), and the spatial diffusion of crime across neighborhoods (Cohen and Tita, 1999) 
and counties (Baller, et al., 2001). 
In Ohio, Medicaid expenditure decisions are made at the state level within federal 
guidelines.  However, the impact of these decisions will vary from place to place 
depending on the needs of the local population and upon the dependence of the local 
economy on the health care industry.  States are required by the federal government to 
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provide an array of basic Medicaid services, but they are also given the discretion to 
provide additional services or offer coverage to groups not included in the federal 
guidelines.  State funding is matched by federal dollars, sometimes up to two dollars for 
each dollar spent by the state.  Clearly, because of this devolution of authority that allows 
states to modify and design their own programs, there will be differences across states in 
the nature and extent of services provided under Medicaid.  However, even within a state, 
there are differences at the local level in the role Medicaid plays in the local economy and 
in the capacity of the counties to deliver these services.   
Most social welfare policies not only attempt to alleviate economic hardship but 
also have distributional goals.  As mentioned above, it is common to study generational 
and economic distributional issues; we focus here on the spatial unevenness.  We explore 
how, through the use of maps, we can obtain a picture of the spatial variation in the need 
for and use of Medicaid assistance and consider how this visual perception can be 
calibrated through the use of spatial statistics.    
Spatial variability measures 
 The standard deviation of a distribution and the variance are common measures of 
dispersion.  The coefficient of variation (CV), which divides the standard deviation by 
the mean, has the added attraction that it provides some insight into the value of the mean 
as an estimate for the overall distribution.P0F1P  A more sophisticated measure of spatial 
variation is the spatial Gini coefficient used by Auderestsch and Feldman (1996) and 
                                                 
1 For example, a coefficient of variation less than 0.33 would imply that the standard deviation is less than 
a third of the mean and that in case of a well behaved symmetric distribution, 0 lies at least 3 standard 
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Krugman (1991) to assess the effects of spatial concentration on product innovation and 
economic growth.  These are, however, overall measures.  Geographical information 
systems offer the ability to actually observe the spatial variability. 
Geographic information systems (GIS) provide multi-layered maps of spatial and 
non-spatial information.  A GIS contains digitized geographic information for producing 
maps.  Its database management capabilities also allow a GIS to incorporate other data, 
oftentimes non-spatial data, such as demographic, economic, social or legal information 
pertaining to the geographical entities.  For example, GIS can be used to display zoning 
information on a city map superimposed with information regarding various 
characteristics of the resident population. 
While the spatial distribution of any measure can be visualized by displaying the 
data on a map, the visualization of patterns can sometimes be deceptive (Tufte, 1983).  
Therefore, it is useful to compute statistics to test whether observations in neighboring 
spatial units such as counties are associated.  One global measure, Moran’s I, is often 
used to statistically measure the correlation across spatial units, or spatial autocorrelation 
















                                                                                                                                                 
deviations from the mean.  For the mean to be considered a “good” estimate for the distribution, one would 
want CV to be even smaller.   
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where n is the number of observations, wRijR are the elements of a spatial weights matrix,P1F2P 
W, and x represents the measure of interest at locations i and j (with mean x ).  SR0R is a 
scaling constant computed by summing the weights: 
 
 ∑ ∑= i j ijwS0  [2] 
 
Statistical inference regarding the randomness of the spatial distribution of the 
data can be made based on the standard normal distribution after making the 
transformation, ZRIR = (I-E[I])/(V[I]P1/2P), where E[I] and V[I]P1/2P represent the theoretical 
mean and standard deviation (Anselin,1988; Cliff and Ord, 1981).  A common alternative 
measure of spatial autocorrelation, Geary’s C, is instead based upon squared deviations 
from the mean. 
The coefficient of variation and the spatial Gini indicate, at an aggregate level, the 
spatial variation and the unevenness of the variation of the distribution, and Moran’s I 
provides a test for whether this variation is random.  Another approach to gaining some 
insight into spatial variation is to determine how local conditions vary from some norm.  
We construct “dependence” indexes to explore variations in economic conditions across 
the counties.  To provide measures of local dependence, we borrow an expositional tool 
from the economic geography and economic development literature that regional 
economists have used for the past 60 years, location quotients (Miller, et al., 1991).  
Location quotients are often used in the economic development literature as a simple 
                                                 
2 The spatial weights matrix used in this paper is a geographic contiguity matrix such that each element wij 
= 1 if two counties share a border and wij = 0 if not. 
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measure of how specialized a particular region is in any particular industry.  We create 
dependence indexes based on the location quotient concept.   
A location quotient (LQ) is a ratio of two proportions that provides a relative 
measure of specialization or dependence.  The measure is relative to the overall level of 
dependence at a more global geographic level, such as the state level.  The index is 
constructed by expressing the proportion of dependence at the local level as a ratio of the 
same proportion at the state level.  For example, a commonly used location quotient 
measures the dependence of the local economy on employment in particular industrial 
sectors.  The index can be expressed as a ratio of the proportion of the total number of 
people employed in a county that are employed in a sector to the proportion of the total 
number of people employed in the state that are employed in that same sector.  More 
formally, the ratio of the two proportions of employment in any industry sector s can be 
written as: 















Where, EMPRcounty_rR and EMPRstateR represent employment in industry sector s in county r 
and for the whole state.  EMP_TOTRcounty_rR and EMP_TOTRstateR measure total employment 
in county r and for the whole state.  Therefore, if LQ = 1, the county is at the state 
average; if LQ > 1, the county is more dependent than the state; and if LQ < 1, the county 
is less dependent than the state. 
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Another way to think of the ratio is that it uses the state’s level of dependence as a 
benchmark for comparison.  If the proportion of county employees working in a sector is 
the same as those at the state level, then the index will be equal to one.  Values other than 
one represent higher or lower levels of dependence on that sector of the economy.   
To illustrate the use of these indexes to identify spatial variability across the state, 
we construct two separate dependence indexes.  To study the distribution of poverty and 
to capture the vulnerability of counties in terms of their dependence on public assistance, 
we construct a poverty index.  This index helps provide an indication of the distribution 
of the population that is most likely to be affected by changes in Medicaid expenditures.  
The second index focuses on healthcare related activity and can be interpreted to be a 
measure of a county’s dependence on the health services sector.  Because Medicaid plays 
an important role in financing the provision of healthcare, this index helps provide an 
indication of the distribution of the industry likely to be most affected by any changes in 
those healthcare expenditures.   
Each dependence index (DI), constructed here, is the geometric mean of three 














The dependence index reflecting poverty, DIRPovertyR, is based upon three measures 
of poverty in the county, and the health index, DIRHealthR, is based upon economic reliance 
10 
upon the health services sector of the economy.  The poverty index is built using county 
level data on a) transfer payments, b) number of households with incomes below 100% of 
the federal poverty level, and c) Medicaid expenditures on county residents.  The health 
services index is built using County Business Patterns data measuring a) the number of 
establishments in the healthcare sector in each county, b) employment in these 
establishments, and c) associated payroll in these establishments. 
Case study 
Medicaid in Ohio 
Ohio’s Medicaid program began in 1968.  Currently, for every dollar Ohio spends 
on Medicaid healthcare services, the federal government reimburses (federal match) the 
state just over $0.58 on average (OHP, 2001).P2F3P  Table 1 provides summary information 
on this program for the three most recent state fiscal years for which data are available.P3F4 
These 1.7 million Medicaid recipients make up approximately 15% of the 11.35 
million residents of Ohio.  The recipients are distributed unevenly across the counties 
(Map 1), ranging from a low of almost 5% to a high of over 30% of the county 
population.  The darker-shaded counties in the southern and southeastern part of the state 
indicate that those counties have the largest percentage of the population who are 
Medicaid recipients.  The counties with the lightest shading and smallest percentage are 
concentrated in the northwest part of the state.  The Moran’s I statistic is 0.615 and the 
                                                 
3 The federal match in FY 2002 was 50% for administrative services, 58.8% for Medicaid services, and as 
high as 71.2% for the children’s program (SCHIP).  
4 The state fiscal year (SFY) in Ohio is from July 1 to June 30.  The federal fiscal year begins on October 1; 
hence, it is important to identify the year for appropriate accounting.  The total expenditures include the 
federal match of state expenditures on Medicaid. 
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corresponding Z-value is 9.602 (p-value = 0.000).  The statistically significant value of 
Moran’s I confirms the visual evidence that the counties with similar percentages of 
Medicaid eligible populations are clustered together and that this clustering is not even 
across the state.     
The Medicaid program consists of a complex system of interdependent 
components with multiple categories of aid, delivery systems, categories of services and 
recipients.  There is considerable variety in the cost of services per recipient.  Younger 
adults and children typically incur fewer expenses compared to the recipients who are 
“aged, blind, or disabled” (ABD).  While the ABD population consists of less than a third 
of the Medicaid recipients, they account for approximately 80% of the expenditures.   
In Ohio, as in other states, Medicaid expenditures are the largest item in the state 
budget after education and therefore are an attractive target for cutbacks during periods of 
fiscal strain.  To explore and to illustrate how apparently spatially neutral policy changes 
at the state level can have disproportionate effects at the local level, we use a reduction in 
the growth rate of Medicaid expenditures of $491 million.  This is one of the figures 
originally proposed in the governor’s biannual budget submitted to the state legislature in 
early 2003 (Candisky and Craig, 2003). 
Data Sources 
 
Analysis of the impact of Medicaid expenditure changes is conducted at the 
county level, and the county level data are collected from various state and federal and 
sources.  Each measure used, the source, and the county mean is listed in Table 2.  In 
most cases, we used data from the most recently available year. 
12 
Ohio Medicaid expenditure data come from the Ohio Department of Job and 
Family Services (ODJFS).  The Office of Ohio Health Plans, which administers the 
Medicaid program in Ohio, publishes the Ohio Medicaid Report.  This annual report 
provides county level information on program expenditures, eligible population and 
funding for different services (OHP, 2001, 2002). 
Socioeconomic characteristics of the counties are drawn from the 2000 Decennial 
Census (US Census Bureau, 2001).  Ohio’s Office of Strategic Research (OSR, 2002) 
publishes County Profiles that compile demographic and economic information about 
each county.  We draw on the data OSR compiled measuring federal transfer payments to 
Ohio Counties in 2000 (BEA, 2001).  Transfer payments include both means-tested 
income maintenance transfers as well as Social Security retirement payments and 
veterans benefits. 
Data on the number of jobs, number of business establishments, and their 
associated payrollP4F5P come from County Business Patterns (US Census Bureau, 2002).  
The Census Bureau reports economic activity data for all of the various sectors of the 
economy.  In order to measure the relative dependence of each county on the health 
services sector, we focus on the “health care and social assistance” sector.  This sector 
includes all public and private healthcare establishments as well as other care facilities.P5F6 
 
                                                 
5 Data for some of the smaller counties were missing since they had too few establishments to maintain 
anonymity.  We interpolated estimates for these counties based on average per capita figures for the state. 
6 NAICS 62, Health care and social assistance, is comprised of four 3-digit NAICs categories:  221 
Ambulatory health care services, 622 Hospitals, 623 Nursing & residential care facilities, and 624 Social 
assistance.  While it would be preferable to exclude NAICS 624 from this analysis in order to isolate health 
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Analysis 
The data report the number of Medicaid recipients in each county rather than the 
county in which the medical services are provided.  It is not clear where recipients obtain 
their services; hence, it is not possible, without analyzing the detailed claims information, 
to ascertain the Medicaid expenditures in each of the counties.  However, based on where 
these recipients live, the average expenditures per recipient vary across counties (Map 2) 
from a low of a little over $3,100 to almost $8,600.  This distribution is uneven in the 
sense that in SFY 2000 the average expenditure for an ABD recipient was approximately 
$14,000 while that for other recipients was approximately $1,400 (OHP, 2002).  This 
wide range, even in the averages, is indicative of the differences in the nature and extent 
of Medicaid services and costs.  The corresponding coefficient of variation is 0.221 and 
the Gini Coefficient is 0.116.P6F7P  Taken together, in the aggregate, these measures suggest 
a fairly tight and even distribution of per capita expenditures. 
A more detailed look at the geographic distribution, however, suggests that 
although the numbers are not distributed over a very wide range, the distribution is not 
spatially random.  The counties with the highest expenditures per recipient are not 
necessarily the ones with the greatest percentage of the population who are Medicaid 
recipients.  Many of the southern counties with the highest percentages have some of the 
lowest expenditures per recipient, as indicated by the lighter shading.  The Moran’s I 
                                                                                                                                                 
care establishments, this would reduce the cell sizes in some counties to a level that would induce data 
suppression to avoid disclosing data for individual firms. 
7 The Gini ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 representing an even distribution.   
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statistic is 0.122 (Z-value = 2.048 and p-value = 0.041), suggesting once again that the 
clustering of counties by per capita expenditures is not random. 
It is worth noting that while the patterns of clustering of the percentage of the 
population who are Medicaid eligible residents and the per capita Medicaid expenditures 
are both non-random, they are not the same.  Hence different policies, for instance those 
that limit expenditures on nursing homes, will have a different effect on counties than 
policies that change eligibility criteria.  It is evident from comparing the two maps (Map 
1 and Map 2) that even though the two different polices might have the same initial 
budgetary effect at the state level, they will not only affect different populations but they 
would also have differential effects on the local county economies in different parts of the 
state.  Map 1 shows the distribution of Medicaid recipients across the state and can be 
used to explore consequences in terms of the percentages of the population affected in 
these counties.  Because Medicaid expenditures vary considerably based upon the various 
services provided, it is also important to examine the distribution of Medicaid 
expenditures per recipient across the counties, as illustrated in Map 2.   
In order to gain a better understanding of why these average expenditures per 
recipient vary so considerably across counties, it is important to further examine 
characteristics of the population distributions.  MAP 3 shows the distributions of the 
populations under age 18 and older than age 64.  We can see from these maps how two 
policies, one altering nursing home reimbursement formulas and the other altering 
eligibility requirements for families with children, could have the exact same fiscal effect 
at the state level but have very different effects at the local level.  Any change in nursing 
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home payments would likely have a larger impact on the east-central counties, which 
have some of the highest concentrations of elderly residents.  Conversely, policies 
affecting the coverage of children would likely have larger impacts in some of the 
western counties that have the largest concentrations of children.  By examining these age 
distributions, we are able to get a clearer picture of why the expenditures vary over space.  
For instance, counties with larger elderly populations are likely to have a more ABD 
recipients, who are much more costly than child recipients.  
County Dependence Indices 
The preceding analysis focused primarily on Medicaid expenditures and the 
potential effects of the proposed reduction of $491 million in state spending growth.  
Medicaid, however, is only one component of a network of support services available to 
the poor and economically disadvantaged segments of society.  As noted earlier, there are 
some counties in Ohio where as much as 30% of the population receives some form of 
Medicaid assistance.  Hence, in some of these counties, the dependence on public 
assistance is substantial and goes beyond healthcare and associated services.  Similarly, 
the size and role that the health services sector plays in the local economy also varies 
considerably across the counties. 
We capture the vulnerability of the counties in terms of their dependence on 
public assistance and their dependence on the health services sector with the separate 
dependence indexes defined above (Equation 4).  The values for the poverty and heath 
services indexes range from approximately half to two, providing another indication of 
the diversity across the state in terms of levels of poverty and extent of the role that 
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healthcare services plays in the local economy.  There is a relatively strong linear 
correlation of 0.71 between these two indexes, indicating that while there is some 
redundancy in the information, they do capture the different variations across the state in 
dependence on public assistance and health services.   
Map 4 and Map 5 provide a visual depiction of the two indexes reflecting the 
variation across counties.  The message that counties would face differential effects of 
changes in Medicaid expenditures appears to be repeated in slightly different ways in 
these two maps.  The range of values for both dependence indexes from 0.5 to 2 implies 
that there are some counties where poverty, as measured by this index, is approximately 
half that of the overall state.  Other places in the state have poverty that is twice as much 
as the overall state level.  The healthcare dependence index also varies over a similar 
range.  There is some overlap in that some of these county economies not only depend 
considerably on the healthcare sector of the economy, but they are also dependent on 
public assistance and transfers.   
Comparing Map 4 with Map 5, we note that the southern counties are both poor 
and dependent on the healthcare sector.  The Moran’s I statistics confirm the non-random 
spatial distribution of the indexes:  Moran’s I = 0.572 for the poverty index (Z-value = 
8.933 and P-value = 0.000) and Moran’s I = 0.180 for the health index (Z-value = 2.932 
and Z-value = 0.003).P7F8P  One would expect to see well paying jobs in the health services 
sector; however, these maps suggest that many of the jobs in the healthcare industry are 
                                                 
8 We also computed the Geary’s C measure of spatial autocorrelation.  We do not report the results because 
they concur precisely with the information obtained from Moran’s I. 
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not high paying.P8F9P  This reliance on public assistance and the healthcare sector makes 
these areas of the state doubly vulnerable to the adverse effects of changes in Medicaid 
funding.  
To capture the vulnerability of counties to cuts in Medicaid expenditures, we use 
the two indexes as weighting factors to estimate the adverse effects of the reductions in 
Medicaid expenditures.  The weighted Medicaid expenditures per resident are displayed 
in Map 6 and Map 7.  By weighting the expenditures by the dependence indexes, we are 
attempting to capture the dependence of counties on Medicaid.  
Consider the poverty index, which varies from approximately one half to almost 
two.  The level of poverty in the county as a whole is much less where the index is a half 
than where it is close to two; hence, what this analysis suggests is that a loss of a 
Medicaid dollar in an affluent county will not be felt as severely as it would be in a poor 
county.  That is not to suggest that an individual who has lost Medicaid coverage will 
suffer any less hardship in one county than in another, but it is possible that in the more 
affluent counties in which there is typically greater economic opportunity, the individual 
affected by cutbacks will have greater opportunities to find other sources of support or 
income.  Similarly, counties heavily dependent on healthcare services sector will be 
proportionately worse off than counties that are less dependent.  This situation is 
analogous to a situation in which a county is dependent upon a particular industry, such 
                                                 
9 As noted earlier, we used data on healthcare as well as social services assistance jobs.  In many instances, 
Medicaid recipients also receive other social services and their eligibility for these services might be 
affected by changes in their Medicaid eligibility status. 
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as steel or mining.  If that industry has a downturn, the whole county’s economic well-
being is adversely affected. 
The coefficient of variation shows that, at an aggregated level, the weighted 
distribution has slightly greater variation than that of the unweighted distribution of 
Medicaid expenditures across the counties.  The coefficient of variation for the 
unweighted expenditure distribution is 0.221, which increases to 0.345 when the 
expenditures are weighted by the poverty index and to 0.317 when weighted by the health 
index.  Similarly, the inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increases across the 
state regardless of which set of weights we consider.  The Gini coefficient increases from 
approximately 0.12 for the unweighted expenditure distribution to approximately 0.17 for 
expenditures weighted by either index.  
However, a more nuanced story emerges when we consider the clustering of these 
counties.  The two maps together show how the counties will experience the burden of 
the proposed cuts.  Based on the Moran’s I, the distribution of the expenditures weighted 
by the poverty index (I = 0.200, Z-value = 3.239, P-value = 0.001) is more spatially auto-
correlated than the distribution of the Medicaid expenditures weighted by the health 
index (I = 0.020, Z-value = 0.480, P-value = 0.631).  In spite of the fact that spatial 
inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increases, the clustering of the poor 
counties is different from the clustering of those that are dependent on healthcare related 
activity.  In other words, spatial consequences will be more severe in terms of poverty, 
since these counties are clustered together, whereas, the spatial consequences in terms of 
healthcare related activity might be mitigated by the fact that nearby counties will not be 
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as severely affected by expenditure reductions.  The counties in the northwest are not 
poor, but some of them do have considerable healthcare services activity.  Hence, these 
counties will suffer some hardship as Medicaid dollars are reduced.  However, the effect 
on these counties will not be as severe as that encountered by the counties in the south 
and the southeast that are both dependent on healthcare and are poor.  Regardless of how 
we choose to measure, it is apparent that the southern and eastern half of the state will 
feel the effects of any reductions in Medicaid expenditures more severely than the 
western half as indicated by the darker shading in the two maps. 
Concluding remarks 
 There is a rich history of distributional analysis across classes of economic, 
demographic, social and intergenerational categories that examine the consequences of 
budgetary choices.  While social scientists have recognized the importance that 
geographers place on location and spatial relationships, they have not always explicitly 
incorporated these notions with the corresponding distributional analyses into their 
examination of public policy choices.  By drawing upon location quotients, maps and 
associated spatial statistics, we have demonstrated that simple yet effective tools for 
measuring spatial unevenness and vulnerability are readily available for policy analysis.  
The appropriate use of these tools can provide powerful insights into the potential for and 
consequences of spatial inequality due to policies that may not initially appear to have 
obvious spatial implications.  Maps are particularly useful in that they provide, in a single 
representation, the ability to both analyze and communicate patterns that emerge from the 
data.  
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 As an example of the implications of the spatial consequences of expenditure 
changes in a program in which budgetary decisions are made centrally, the paper has 
reported on an examination of the rate of growth of the Ohio Medicaid program.  
Although the county governments serve primarily as conduits for the state and federal 
Medicaid funds, changes in policies at the state level can have profound implications at 
the local level.  If individuals lose access to healthcare or if healthcare institutions lose 
funding for the provision of that care, the resulting impacts place additional burdens on 
local governments and local social service organizations.  These consequences at the 
local level vary based on local characteristics and circumstances.  For example, because 
nursing homes represent the largest component of Medicaid expenditures, political 
attention has focused on them as potential targets for budget cuts.  Placing caps on 
nursing home expenditures will particularly affect counties with larger elderly 
populations and those with the highest concentration of nursing homes.  Reduced 
expenditures on nursing homes will affect the elderly recipients and their families, and 
some of the burden of assisting them will transfer from Medicaid to other local agencies 
and service providers.  From a provider’s perspective, reduced reimbursements could 
lead to cutbacks or even closures, resulting in job losses and other secondary economic 
consequences that have fiscal impacts on local governments. 
 Hence, the potential implications of different policy choices at the state level will 
be quite different depending upon local conditions.  Constructing indexes such as those 
developed in this paper would be one way of predicting what the local consequences 
might be and where their effects will be greatest.  As we have shown, choice of the 
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appropriate index is important to correctly characterize the nature of the consequences.  
Such analysis is useful not only for local administrators, who need to plan for the 
budgetary implications of statewide policy, but also for state policy makers, who need to 
be cognizant of how policy affects different parts of the state. 
 This is not to say that all variation in spatial consequences is bad.  In fact, local 
variability is a primary rationale for devolution of authority and responsibility from 
federal to state governments and beyond.  The jealousy with which local school boards 
guard their autonomy and differences is indicative of the need and desire for maintaining 
local diversity.  However, court decisions regarding equity in school funding testify to the 
limits to the amount of variability, particularly fiscal variability that communities are 
willing to tolerate.  As this paper demonstrates, there are non-trivial spatial consequences 
of policy changes.  The challenge for policy analysis is to determine when these 
differences in consequences are desirable and when they are not.   
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Table 1.  Comparison Medicaid Data for SFY1999-2001 
 
 SFY1999 SFY2000 SFY2001 
 























Table 2. Data  
 
Measure (County-level) Source Year  Mean 
Medicaid Recipients ODJFSPaP  2001 19,047.24 
Percent Medicaid Recipients Constructed 2001 15.01 
Medicaid Expenditures (millions) ODJFSPaP  2001 $90.60 
Expenditures per Recipient Constructed 2001 $4,929.83 
Residents Decennial Census 2000 129,013.00 
Total Households Decennial Census 2000 50,529.78 
Households in Poverty Decennial Census 2000 13,303.39 
Transfer Payments (millions) OSRPbP  1999 $486.00 
Total Establishments County Business Patterns 2000 3,073.34 
Jobs County Business Patterns 2000 56,789.20 
Healthcare Establishments County Business Patterns 2000 286.70 
Healthcare Jobs County Business Patterns 2000 7,360.41 
Healthcare Payroll (millions) County Business Patterns 2000 $216.83 
Poverty Index Constructed 2000 1.00 
Medicaid Expenditures by Poverty Index Constructed 2001 $4,880.06 
Health Index Constructed 2000 0.95 




P Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (OHP 2001, 2002) 
P
b
P Office of Strategic Research, Ohio Department of Development (OSR, 2002) 
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CV = 0.221 
Gini = 0.116 
I = 0.122 
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MAP 3.  Young and Elderly Populations   
 
 





















1.19 - 1.921  
 
 
PI = 1    County is at state average 
PI > 1   County is more dependent  
PI < 1     County is less dependent 
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HI = 1    County is at state average 
HI > 1   County is more dependent  
HI < 1     County is less dependent 
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CV = 0.345 
Gini = 0.168 
I = 0.200 
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CV = 0.317 
Gini = 0.166 
I = 0.020 
